Introduction
The theory of incomplete contracts is central to the modern theory of the firm.
This perspective has generated powerful insights about the organization of activities within a firm, the boundaries of organizations, and about the design of relationships between firms (Hart [1995] , Aghion and Tirole [1997] , Hart and Moore [1999] ). In this paper, we look for support for predictions of two incomplete contract models. The first is the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights framework, which predicts that assets in a bilateral relationship should be owned by the party whose marginal effort has the greatest impact on project success. The second is Aghion and Tirole's [1994] model of contracting for innovations, which suggests that in addition to these concerns, relative bargaining power is an important determinant of the allocation of property rights.
Our analysis tests these predictions in a relatively new contracting setting. We examine alliances that Internet portals entered into from 1995 through 1999. As Tirole [1999] points out, theorists who develop incomplete contract models generally justify the assumption that contracts are incomplete by invoking unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts, and the cost of enforcing contracts. In the Internet environment, the turbulence of the competitive landscape, the uncertainty about the future value of decisions, the perceived need for speed in decision-making, and the existence of new but poorly understood measures of performance and effort correspond well with the assumptions that lead theorists to build incomplete contracting models. This provides a strong rationale for viewing these transactions through an incomplete contracting lens.
Using this theoretical lens, we examine a set of over 100 alliance contracts between Internet portals and other firms. Although we extensively analyze a large number of features of these agreements in a separate paper (Elfenbein and Lerner [2001] ), we restrict our analysis here to the issues suggested by viewing these agreements as incomplete contracts.
We find that the structure of the alliance contracts provides significant support for the predictions of incomplete contract theories. In our analysis, two major conclusions emerged:
• The division of ownership displayed a pattern consistent with the predictions of the incomplete contracting literature, such as Grossman and Hart [1986] . The ownership of critical elements such as the web site address and the customer data was typically assigned to the party whose effort was most critical to the success of the agreement.
• The allocation of control rights appeared most sensitive to the bargaining power of the two contracting parties. The theoretical literature often does not make a clear distinction between the division of ownership and control. In the portal agreements, however, control was assigned in a somewhat different manner than ownership: most critical appears to be the relative financial and product market strength of the two parties. This division of control was consistent with Aghion and Tirole [1994] The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we examine the causes and consequences of contractual incompleteness, paying particular attention to the theoretical models that we will test. Section 3 discusses portal alliances and aspects of the contracting environment that lead us to believe that the incomplete contracting perspective is relevant to their analysis. In Section 4, we describe the creation of the data set. Section 5 presents the analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
Contractual Incompleteness and its Consequences
Formal-i.e., written-contracts form the basis for many business relationships.
Contracts frequently define the quality, quantity, and timing of a good or service to be exchanged between two parties, specific investments to be made to support the delivery of these goods and services, and the distribution of gains from the transaction.
Furthermore, contracts frequently specify penalties if specific commitments are breached.
Information conditions, however, constrain the design of contracts. Some actions may be neither observable nor verifiable, making contractual terms that specify them unenforceable. Under these conditions, it may not be possible to design a contract that elicits the optimal behavior from the contracting parties based only upon observable and verifiable variables. Contracts are then said to be incomplete. The actual information conditions that preclude writing complete contracts based on observable measures is a matter of some theoretical debate. As Tirole [1999] notes, the assumption of contractual incompleteness is generally accompanied by an invocation of transaction costs, specifically unforeseen contingencies, the cost of writing contracts, and the cost of enforcing contracts. In particular, Tirole emphasizes how the indescribability of future contingencies can introduce information problems and can make it impossible to write an ex ante contract based on observable measures that correctly represents the parties' ex ante preferences.
Beginning with Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1988] , numerous contracting models consider settings in which the inability to observe effort and enforce agreements creates severe problems.
1 This approach has come to be known as the property rights approach. In the property rights setting, one or both parties make a relationship-specific investment in assets that are critical to the production process.
These assets could be machines, land, software, patents, copyrights, or any other relationship-specific, but alienable, property. Ownership of the assets confers upon the owning party residual rights of control over the assets, i.e., ownership confers decision rights over all uses of the assets that are not specified in the contract or that are not enforceable by a court.
A typical assumption in this literature is that it is impossible for two parties to write a verifiable contract which could be enforced in a court of law and which specifies the effort and final output of the two parties. Taking this contracting problem as given, these models argue that it is optimal for ownership of a project to be assigned to the party whose effort has the greatest marginal impact on the outcome. This owner gains bargaining power from asset ownership that enables him to appropriate a majority of the surplus that results from the project. Because of this incentive, the party will make 1 Holmström and Roberts [1998] argue that a variety of factors other than an inability to specify a complete contract may affect the formation and structure of alliances. These include the need for information transfers and the extent of agency problems. As the authors note, however, the impact of these factors needs further theoretical attention.
decisions that maximize-or come close to maximizing-the returns from the project.
This conclusion is quite different from that of traditional studies of interactions between principals and agents (e.g., Holmström [1979] ), which generally conclude that the incentives offered the contracting parties (cash flow rights) are critical, but not the allocation of control rights.
The ex ante allocation of ownership, then, with its accompanying residual rights of control over the productive asset, is performed to maximize the ex post gains from trade. It is possible, however, to restrict the set of residual control rights granted to the asset owner by including a number of specified control rights in the contract. Specified control rights have garnered little attention in the literature, but are commonly used in practice. Specified control rights may take many forms, including restrictions on the nature of investments into the productive asset and restrictions on how the asset can be used once investments have been sunk. 2 Specified control rights place boundaries on the set of decisions that contracting parties can make and thus serve a similar role to ownership in the property rights approach in creating incentives. Empirical analyses of
contracting should, therefore, analyze the allocation of specified control rights in addition to ownership.
Under certain circumstances, ex ante allocation of ownership and specified control rights may not maximize ex post surplus. Aghion and Tirole [1994] analyze one such circumstance. They analyze an R&D alliance between a research unit and a 2 These restrictions might be thought of as corresponding to the elimination of one type of action in a multi-tasking environment.
customer in which liquidity constraints can prevent the ownership of an innovation from being allocated efficiently. In their basic model, the authors assume that the research unit is without financial resources of its own, cannot borrow any funds, and has no ability to commercialize the innovation itself. As a result, it turns for financing to a customer, a firm that may intend to use the product itself or to resell it to others but cannot make the discovery independently. The success of the research project is an increasing function, though at a decelerating rate, of both the effort provided by the research unit and the resources provided by the customer. Developing a contract between the two parties is challenging. While the ownership of the product can be specified in an enforceable contract, and the resources provided by the customer may also be so specified, uncertainty precludes writing a contract for the delivery of a specific innovation.
Similarly, an enforceable contract cannot be written that specifies the level of effort that the research unit will provide.
Aghion and Tirole consider two polar cases: when the research unit has the ex ante bargaining power, and when the customer does. When the research unit has the bargaining power, the ownership of the research output will be efficiently allocated. If the marginal impact of the research unit's effort on the innovative output is greater than the marginal impact of the customer's investment, then the research unit will receive the property rights. If not, the research unit will transfer ownership to the customer in exchange for a cash payment. This result is similar to that of Grossman and Hart [1986] .
When the customer has the bargaining power, however, a different pattern emerges. If it is optimal for the customer to own the project, it will retain the project. If, however, it would maximize innovation for the property rights to be transferred to the research unit, the surplus-maximizing outcome will not be achieved. In particular, the customer will be willing to transfer ownership, but the cash-constrained research unit will not have enough resources to compensate the customer. As a result, an inefficient allocation of the property rights occurs, with the customer retaining the rights to the invention.
The key insight, for this paper, from the Aghion and Tirole model is that the division of assets and specified control rights may be responsive to a concern other than those that maximize joint surplus, namely relative bargaining power. Although the model presented by Aghion and Tirole deals formally with two parties, its results generalize to the case in which the upstream (or the downstream) party has multiple potential trading partners. The number and quality of these partners, on both sides of the market, determine the relative bargaining power of the firms, which the model incorporates in reduced form. 
Portal Alliances and the Contracting Environment

A. Portals and Portal Alliances
Portals-which can be defined as Internet sites that provide (directly or indirectly) Beginning in 1997, portals began adding a broad array of materials to their sites.
These included content, such as stock prices and news headlines, as well as services, such as on-line auctions and personal e-mail. The evolution of the services offered by portals is illustrated by Figure 1 , which displays the evolution of Yahoo!'s homepage between 1994 and 1999. The basic services were typically available for free. Portals generated revenues principally through the sale of banner advertisements and sponsorships. Many portals also sought to diversify their revenue bases with transaction fees from merchandise sold on their sites by strategic partners and through other means. 4 Gandal [2001] examines competition within the search engine segment of the portal industry and finds that while first mover advantages were important in attracting unique visitors, search engines competed on the quality of search services, which became an increasingly important determinant of traffic over time. Alliance contracts were negotiated against the backdrop of a highly uncertain and volatile environment. Although projected to grow exponentially, the volume of demand -10 -for on-line goods and services and the exact nature of this demand were highly uncertain.
During this period, pundits coined the phrase "Internet time" and stressed speedy decision making in the new media environment; this suggests that the opportunity cost of bargaining over additional contractual provisions may have been high. Furthermore, although portal alliances were considered by many to be essential to survival in the online environment, the value of the agreements themselves was highly uncertain and was a subject for debate among contemporaneous observers. The uncertainty surrounding the development of the Internet industry evokes the unforeseen, indescribable contingencies behind the assumptions used to justify incomplete contracting models.
The alliance contracts negotiated by portals were frequently complex. Contracts specified, in some detail, the relationship-specific assets to be developed, the ownership of these assets, the restrictions on their use, the payment terms, and other governance considerations. The focus of the alliances exhibited considerable heterogeneity, ranging from promotion agreements, to the development of new co-branded sites, to agreements in which the partner made a technology or service available to the portal's users. Issues of ownership, control, exclusivity, term length, performance guarantees, and compensation were important features of nearly every alliance contract, and varied considerably by portal, partner, and type. These differences are analyzed systematically in Elfenbein and Lerner [2001] .
B. Portal Alliances as Incomplete Contracts
Property rights theory deals with organizational form, typically focusing on the decision of two parties to integrate vertically or to remain independent. The property rights paradigm can apply equally well, however, within a firm as at the firm's boundaries. Applications within and between firms are found throughout the literature (e.g., Hart and Moore [1999] , Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy [2001] ). We examine alliances, which are found at the boundaries of organizations, but which are a case of non-integration.
The property-rights approach maps relatively neatly onto the setting of portal alliances. Contracts between the portal and its partner specified actions or relationshipspecific investments that were intended to generate commercial value for both firms.
Types of specific investments included custom software, tailored content, a promotion campaign, or a co-branded website for the portals' users. These investments frequently created tangible assets, for example, the software code that generated the co-branded site, the copyrighted content that users read, or the infrastructure that delivered products or services to customers.
Three types of assets were common to the majority of the alliance contracts: the servers used by the alliance, the uniform resource locator (or URL), and the customer data. These assets provided good proxies for the assets created for the alliance. For example, ownership of the servers on which the alliance technology was hosted provided the owner with considerable residual control rights over the technology itself. Ownership of the URL enabled the owner to record credit for traffic on his site 5 and also to re-direct the site traffic to another location if the relationship ended or broke down. Ownership of customer data enabled the owner to control the customer relationship, which the owner might continue to profit from after the alliance broke down. While it is conceivable that contracts could have specified many of the potential decision rights regarding these assets ex ante, it seems unlikely that all possible future decisions could be specified in a contract, especially given the commercial uncertainty in the Internet arena. As long as there were some decision rights over the assets not specified in the contract, ownership of these assets provided incentives for the owning party to invest in the relationship, because he would retain the assets if the relationship broke down.
6
Ownership of the alliance assets would not provide important incentives for the alliance parties if all investment and effort decisions could be specified in a contract and verified by a court. They would also not be particularly interesting if parties' effort decisions had little impact on the value of the alliance. Our examination of the portal alliance contracts and discussions with alliance managers at several major portals lead us to believe that both parties' effort decisions were likely to impact the value of the alliances and that many of these effort decisions were non-contractible.
5 During this period, Trueman, et al. [2001] find Internet firms' valuations responded to measures of traffic. Our discussions with practitioners suggested that this was frequently a major point of negotiation in the period in question.
6 Technological or practical considerations may also have driven some of the ownership allocation decisions that we study. In some cases, for example the servers used for hosting, ownership could entail a cost that parties wished to avoid. Alternatively, some configurations of asset ownership could generate higher overall costs for the alliance, particularly if one party could take advantage of scale economies not available to the other.
There were several ways in which the effort decisions made by portals could influence the value of the agreement for one or both parties. In many cases specifying these effort decisions in a contract was difficult, if not impossible. Three examples are provided below:
• Portals' ongoing efforts to upgrade and expand their sites could change the value of an agreement for the partner. A telling example involves an alliance partner that purchased a position of prominence on the health content area of a major portal.
Subsequently, this portal designed a new content area focused on the health needs of the elderly which, presumably, would take some traffic away from the main health area. In the end, the portal offered the alliance partner a right of first refusal for prominent ads on this new area and a half-price rate for the first six months; but this was an unanticipated expenditure for the alliance partner.
• Portals could affect alliance performance by using individual customer information and data about aggregate behavior patterns. Sophisticated portals possessed technology that enabled them to direct traffic towards certain alliance partners and not others. This technology allowed the portal to change the position of links and banner
ads depending on what information it had about the individual user (and based on its overall information about traffic patterns and usage). For example, a user who typically searched for music information could be presented with ads for musicrelated web sites, even if he were browsing the portal's health information.
• Portals' internal operations were typically organized by content area-such as sports, finance, or health-which were managed by one or two individuals. These managers made decisions about the design of their content area and had editorial discretion over the placement of banner advertisements and links. They also made daily decisions about how partner content was incorporated into the site.
Although it seems possible, in theory, to contractually specify several of portals' effort decisions, our observations of the contracts themselves suggest that efforts to do so were limited. Some contracts did specify the position of links on a web page, limited the total number of advertisements on a page, and imposed restrictions on the placement of links with respect to competitors' links. Such provisions, however, were present only in a small minority of contracts. These attempts and other more thorough attempts to specify portals' effort decisions contractually were likely limited by monitoring and enforcement issues.
Partner firms' effort decisions, too, could impact the performance of the alliance, and many of these decisions also were not fully contractible. In many alliances, the quality of the partner's technology or co-branded website might be particularly difficult to specify. For content agreements, partner firms controlled the frequency and quality of updates. For integrated technology or service agreements, uptime and reliability were major issues. If partners did not invest sufficiently in servers to host the alliance technology, performance would suffer. For sales agreements, the speed of order fulfillment, customer service response times, and other factors could greatly affect the user's experience. In some cases, contracts provided for renegotiation or termination of the alliance if the partner firm were not among the top 3 to 5 websites in its category (as -15 -measured by an independent auditor). Some attempts to contract on technical performance measures of the alliance partner were made, but again, contracting on these technical performance measures was rare and not uniformly applied.
Finally, in many alliances both parties had opportunities to behave opportunistically in competing for customers. Portals would gain more if users were returned to the portals' sites and, when the two parties shared the proceeds of product sales, if repeat purchases were made through the alliance site rather than through the partner site. Partners, on the other hand, would benefit if returning users would bypass the portal site and access them directly. Occasionally, some of these issues were addressed directly in the contract. For example, nearly 40 percent of the contracts included some provision relating to return traffic, 7 but in many cases the parties found it too difficult or costly to negotiate and enforce such terms in their agreement.
In summary, the effort decisions of both parties were likely to have a substantial impact on the value of the alliances. Many of these effort decisions were not included in the alliance contracts themselves, either because they were actually non-contractible or because the parties simply neglected to include them. 8 Thus, in the absence of the ability to write complete contracts based on performance and effort, asset ownership likely provided important incentives to the contracting parties.
In addition to asset ownership, which provides residual control rights, we examine specified control rights in our analysis. We feel that this is justified for two reasons.
First, specified control rights seem to be important in the design of portal alliances.
Second, as discussed in section 2, specified control rights narrow the scope of residual control rights. In this sense, they act in a similar manner to asset ownership-they restrict what the other party can do with the relationship specific assets. Because specified control rights act as restrictions on residual control rights (as does ownership in property rights theory), we feel justified in examining control rights through the lens of models that emphasize ownership.
Data Set
To undertake the analysis, we identified a set of 106 contracts between portals and other firms entered into between 1995 and 1999. These contracts were identified primarily from Recap/IT, a consulting firm that maintains a database of contracts involving Internet, technology, and telecommunications firms. Publicly traded Internet firms, like other concerns, are required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to file material documents. Internet companies tend to interpret this requirement conservatively, and often file alliance contracts. Recap/IT identifies alliances from press releases, analyst reports, and reviews of SEC filings. Their database includes links to the filings of these firms detailing each agreement. A random sample of contracts from this database was chosen. We reviewed these documents carefully to identify the key features -17 -of these agreements. After considerable experimentation, we developed a coding form that captured the key features of these alliances.
Supplemental financial information was gathered from Compustat and
Worldscope on the financial position of the contracting firms in the quarter prior to the signing of the contract. Information about the contracting parties' web traffic, including the reach of the websites, the number of days per visitor per month, and the number of minutes per visitor per month were collected from Media Metrix for the month in which the agreement was signed. A more detailed discussion of data collection process is provided in Elfenbein and Lerner [2001] . Table 1 summarizes the sample of agreements used in this analysis. In Panel A, the date of the agreements is tabulated. The agreements were concentrated in the second half of the period under study. This reflected the acceleration in the level of Internet activity over the course of the 1990s.
Panel B summarizes the relative effort required in the alliance. We examined five activities that frequently were required after the agreement was signed: the development of material for the site (whether content, services, or technology), the maintenance and hosting of the site, the provision of customer service, order fulfillment, and billing. We coded these as +1 if the portal was required to make the greater effort on this dimension, -1 if the partner was required to do so, and 0 if the effort was jointly shared or not -18 -required by the agreement. While the sum of these five effort measures ranged from +5
to -5, in most cases, the bulk of the post-agreement effort was required of the partner.
Panel C presents the traffic on Internet sites of the two parties in the month before the signing of the agreement. In making these calculations, we compiled all properties owned by the contracting firm: for instance, the usage data for an alliance signed by Disney in 1999 would include information about visits to ABC.com. Not surprisingly, portals' sites were visited by more users, more frequently, and for longer than partners' sites.
Panel D considers the relative financial health of the two parties. There was a great deal of variation, which reflected the fact that we examined the financial health of the entire corporate entity if it had 100% ownership of the contracting firm. For instance, in a transaction involving Snap.com, the financial information of its parent, General
Electric, was recorded.
The relationship between selected contract provisions is presented in Appendix Table A1 . Each provision was coded as +1 if present in the contract and as 0 otherwise.
Analysis
In the analyses, we tested the predictions of the property rights theory and of Aghion and Tirole [1994] , by examining the relationship between contractual provisions of effort, ownership, control, and the financial and product market strength of the two parties. In each table, we divided the observations by four measures: the date of the agreement, the relative effort required of the two parties, the relative traffic on the two parties' Internet sites (as measured through the sites' reach), and the relative financial strength of the contracting parties (as measured through revenues in the previous four quarters).
9
The first two measures were divided roughly into thirds: we placed approximately the same number of observations in each of the three time and effort categories. It did not, however, make as much sense to divide the traffic and financial measures in this way. For instance, it was unclear whether a distinction between a portal that was visited five times more often than the partner and one that was visited ten times more often was very meaningful. Thus, we divided the observations into those where the portal was visited at least three times more often or had three times greater revenues than the partner, those where this held for the partner, and intermediate cases. As a result, the number of observations in these cells was not even. In particular, there were relatively few cases where the partner had significantly greater reach than the portal.
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One potential problem that the analysis faced was non-independence of the observations. In particular, a number of portals appeared frequently in the sample.
While the alliance agreements of the portals were certainly not identical, we suspected that there might have been common elements across the agreements of each portal. In the regression analyses, we addressed this concern by calculating heteroskedastic-corrected standard errors (grouped by each major portal). We also included dummy variables in many regressions for each of the seven portals most frequently represented in the sample (America Online, Excite, iVillage, Lycos, Microsoft Network, Netscape, and Yahoo!) to control for the presence of portal-specific effects.
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A. Ownership
We began by considering the ownership of the agreement. Ownership, a critical concept in the theoretical depictions of incomplete contracting discussed above, was manifested in three ways in these alliances. First, and perhaps most directly, the URL (the Uniform Resource Locator, or the Internet address) may have been assigned to one or the other parties. Second, the servers may have been designated as the property of one or the other parties. Third, the customer data (if any) may have been assigned to one or the other parties. In each case, we coded the variable as +1 if ownership was assigned to the portal, -1 if assigned to the partner, and 0 if there was joint ownership or the ownership provision was not applicable.
12 Table 2 summarizes the allocation of ownership. Ownership did not display a significant pattern across time, or with relative traffic or revenues of the two parties. But there was a sharp difference with who provided the greatest effort in the alliance. Panel D reports that among the alliances where the partner made the greatest effort after the agreement was signed, 1.6 more ownership rights (out of the possible three) were assigned to the partner. Among those where the portal made the greatest effort, 1.0 more ownership rights were assigned to the portal. For each of the ownership provisions analyzed, the effects were significant at the one-percent confidence level. The division of ownership was quite consistent with the predictions in incomplete contracting literature, such as Grossman and Hart [1986] .
These patterns were corroborated in regression analyses, which analyzed the sum of the three ownership rights. We employed an ordered logit specification. This specification avoided some of the problems posed by the differing importance of the various ownership rights. Such a regression methodology treated an alliance assigning 12 One question about the multiple measures of ownership in this analysis (and the other measures used below) is the extent to which they are correlated. If they were closely correlated, the independence of the individual tests would be suspect. The measures were positively correlated, but certainly not perfectly: the mean correlation coefficient of the ownership measures was 0.30. This correlation was considerably less in the analyses below: for instance, the average correlation coefficient of the twelve control measures was 0.07.
two ownership rights to the portal as more favorable to the portal than one with one such rights, but not necessary twice as favorable.
In each of the regressions reported in Table 3 , the relative effort was positive and statistically significant. The effects were large as well: at the mean of the independent variables, a one standard deviation increase in the effort variable shifted the predicted allocation of ownership from an even division to +1 (one additional ownership right assigned to the portal). Similarly, a one standard deviation reduction in effort led to a predicted ownership of -1. The results were robust to the use of alternative measures for the relative popularity of the two parties' sites and their relative financial condition, 13 as well as to the addition of controls for the type of transaction and the portal. In unreported regressions, we employed an ordinary least squares specification rather than an ordered logit one, and added controls for the age of the portal and partner. The results continued to be robust to these changes. In further regressions, we analyzed several sub-samples of alliances and found ownership to be highly sensitive to allocation of effort in each case.
14 13 The sample size shrank when we used the difference between the financial measures or especially the site popularity measures. This is because we did not include observations in these regressions where one of the parties was missing data, which frequently was the case for newly established partners.
14 The individual provisions that were used to form the relative effort metric varied somewhat in their applicability across the sample. In many alliances, each of the five effort provisions was relevant. In others-for example an agreement between Reuters and Infoseek to provide news content-effort provisions such as order fulfillment, billing, and customer service were not relevant. The relevance of the effort provisions might depend on two factors. First, if the alliance created a new, co-branded space, it was more likely that all five effort provisions would be relevant to the agreement. In agreements where no new co-branded space was created, it was less likely that all would apply. Second, if the alliance focused on product sales, it was most likely that all five effort provisions would apply. If the alliance focused on a service, at least three of the effort provisions were likely to apply, and for alliances focused on content, two were A seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) employing an ordered logit specification enabled us to look at the individual provisions driving the relationship between effort and ownership. Results from the non-linear SUR analysis are presented in Table 4 . Under the basic specification, the effort variables are individually and jointly significant (and positively correlated with ownership) for each of the ownership variables considered at the p < 0.01 or p < 0.05 level. After controlling for the commercial focus of the agreement, the coefficient of the effort variable on URL ownership falls in significance, but the remaining coefficients are significantly different from zero at p < 0.01, as are the three ownership variables jointly. 15 In unreported regressions using SUR with an OLS specification we find similar results.
B. Control
We then identified twelve major aspects of the governance of the agreements that were common to the set of agreements we analyzed. The first set were control rights that could be assigned to either party (at least in theory). First, the lines-of-business that one of the parties could engage in were sometimes restricted. One of the parties may have likely to apply. To ensure that a single subset of these contracts was not driving the empirical results described above, ordered logit regressions were performed on each of the five separate sub-samples. Table A2 in the appendix reports the coefficients and robust standard errors on the relative effort variable for each of these sub-sample regressions. In the basic specification, relative effort was both economically and statistically significant in each of the sub-samples, and with the exception of service agreements, relative effort remained significant when relevant controls for deal type and portals could be added.
reserved the right to approve all content that the other prepared as part of the agreement, to post a set of standards to which the other party had to conform, or to determine the "look and feel" of the site. One of the parties may have been required to mention the other (or the co-branded pages) in any advertising of its own web site or to submit all advertising to the other party for approval. These provisions were coded as +1 if this provision favored the portal, -1 if it favored the partner, and 0 if neutral.
The second set of control rights specifically limited the activities of the partner.
Several of these sought to insure that portal's users would have minimal disruption when visiting the site: the partner may have been required to optimize the site for viewing by a certain browser, to use a certain software package in the construction of the site, to employ certain navigation devices (e.g., frames), and to make a "good faith" effort to return visitors back to the portal. Finally, in some cases, the portal either made an equity investment in the partner or reserved the right to attend its board meetings. These rights were coded as +1 if present and 0 if absent. Table 5 analyzes the distribution of control rights. Unlike the depiction in the theoretical literature-which often does not make a clear distinction between the division of ownership and control-here a distinct pattern appeared. The effort required of the portal did not appear to have a linear effect on the allocation of control. As Panel M reports, it was those agreements near the median in the division of effort where the most control rights were granted the portal.
-25 -Rather, the bargaining power of the two contracting parties appeared to have the most dramatic impact on the allocation of control rights. For six out of twelve control rights, when the portal had much greater revenues than the partner, significantly more rights were assigned to the portal. These results continued to hold when we examined the aggregate number of control rights granted in Panel M. In a similar vein, when portals had significantly more reach, they obtained more control rights. As discussed above, Aghion and Tirole [1994] suggest that, among other considerations, the relative bargaining power of the two parties will impact the allocation of ownership (and hence control) over an alliance. The pattern of control right allocation was consistent with their suggestion, though the differing patterns of ownership and control seen here were not discussed in their work. The pattern was also consistent with the biotechnology alliances analyzed by Lerner and Merges [1998] .
These results continued to hold when we examined the patterns in a regression analysis. Once again, we employed the sum of control rights as the dependent variable in an ordered logit regression. 16 As Table 6 displays, the measure of the relative visitations to the two parties' sites remained significant, whether we used the composite measure discussed in the introduction to this section or the difference between the two parties on several dimensions. 17 Again, the results were significant economically. In the leftmost regression, at the mean of the other independent variables, a shift from the partner having a greater reach than the portal to an even division changed the predicted division of control rights from being on a borderline between an even division and +1 to having one control right assigned to the portal. When the portal had the greater reach, the predicted allocation of control rights was +2. The results were robust to the various changes to the specification described in Section 5A.
Bargaining power is not the only explanation for the division of control rights that is observed in the sample. One alternative explanation is that control rights are introduced into a contract to mitigate franchise risk. Many alliances may entail significant franchise risk: poor performance or even non-performance by one party may reduce the value of the other's brand. In this way, franchise risk would enter into the firm's profit function and would be addressed explicitly in the bargaining process. If reach is good proxy for brand strength, then it might be efficient for more control rights to be allocated to the party with more at stake.
Because some of the control provisions are more likely to mitigate franchise risk than others, the data set does give us some ability to distinguish between the two theories. 18 Toward this end, we generated two alternative composite control measures.
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First, we excluded provisions related to content restrictions from the composite control measure; in the resulting regressions, relative reach remains significant in the basic specification and after the addition of deal type and portal controls as well as in regressions using alternative measures of relative reach. Table A3 in the appendix reports these results. Second, we excluded provisions related to both content restrictions and provisions relating to control over "look and feel" from the composite control measure. After making this adjustment, relative reach is nearly significant at the p < 0.1 level in the basic specifications and is not significant when controls for deal type are added. When alternative measures of relative reach are used on the subset of alliances for which they are available, however, relative reach is highly significant. Table A4 in the appendix reports these results. Moreover, in these regressions, relative financial strength, another potential measure of bargaining power, is highly significant. Thus, stripping away the issue of franchise risk, relative bargaining power still seems to have an impact on the allocation of control rights, consistent with Aghion and Tirole [1994] . Table 7 presents the results of a seemingly unrelated regression of the twelve control provisions that make up the composite control variable. 20 These regressions indicate that six of the twelve control provisions are responsible for the significance of the bargaining power measures: restrictions on the partner's line-of-business, conformance to posted content standards, determination of the site's "look and feel", optimization of the site for a specific browser, requirement to mention other party in advertising, and the requirement to try to return traffic to the portal's site. In the twelve simultaneous regressions, the coefficients on relative sales are jointly significant at the p < 0.05 level. 21 When only the six 'driving' regressions are included, relative reach is also significant at the p < 0.10 level. In an unreported regression, we included dummy variables for deal type in the SUR equations; relative sales remained significant at the p <0.05 level. The regressions reported in Table 7 provide corroborative evidence that bargaining power matters in the allocation of control rights.
Conclusion
This paper examined the how well contract theory explains ownership and the specification of control rights in alliances by Internet portals from 1995 to 1999. Our empirical tests supplied support for models of incomplete contracting. In particular, the division of ownership in these alliances was highly sensitive to the allocation of (critical) effort between the parties. Furthermore, the allocation of control rights appeared most sensitive to measures of the relative bargaining power of the two parties, consistent with incomplete contracting models that allow for financing asymmetries between the two parties.
Several questions about the design of these contracts and the applicability of incomplete contracting theory, however, remain. First, in this industry there appeared to be many observable measures of performance and effort. In a separate paper (Elfenbein and Lerner [2001] ), we examine the use of additional measures of performance and effort in these contracts. Our interpretation of the analysis is that firms rarely contracted on available measures of product market and technical performance during the period of study. Why the contracting parties would fail to include all such provisions in agreements, if indeed they were enforceable, was not obvious. Consistent with the incomplete contracting view, we interpret the lack of inclusion of such provisions as strengthening the incentives that come from ownership and control rights.
Second, we find it puzzling that we need to invoke two separate theories to explain the division of ownership and control rights. In our data, control rights are sensitive to relative bargaining power, but ownership is not. Although the patterns of ownership are robust in every technology-based partition of the sample that we analyzed, it is possible that technological considerations, rather than maximization of ex post surplus, are the primary forces driving the allocation of ownership rights. In the absence of these technological considerations, both variables might have shown sensitivity to relative bargaining power.
Additionally, the incentive impact of ownership-rather than cash flow rights-in models of incomplete contracts stems from the threat of renegotiation after the relationship-specific investments are sunk. Parties anticipate this potential for renegotiation and accordingly allocate ownership and the surplus generated by the agreement. In the alliances we investigate, not all of the effort / investment is sunk prior to the commencement of the alliance. For example, maintaining the quality of customer service or adding additional servers to maintain speed as alliance traffic increases require ongoing investments. It is not clear how the ongoing character of the effort / investment decisions of the contracting parties affects the property rights result, although a related issue-namely the role of sequential investments and contingent ownership structureshas been investigated (Noeldeke and Schmidt [1998] ). Moreover, in the contracts we observe, considerable attention is given to specifying the payment terms. Contingent payments based on product sales, new subscribers, and other measures are included in many contracts. It is possible that these payment systems are merely sophisticated methods of dividing the agreement's surplus. It is also possible, however, that the payment terms themselves provide important incentives to the parties and thereby impact the value of the agreement. The interaction between cash flow rights and ownership when investments are ongoing is a potential avenue for theorists to explore.
We believe this study highlights another potentially intriguing question for theorists. During the period in question, portals and their partners, not to mention public investors and venture capitalists, seemed to possess a systematically upward bias in their assessment of the value of Internet traffic. This led to the signing of alliance contracts that some industry experts retrospectively believe was irrational. Several announcements of alliances which subsequently proved to be poorly designed were viewed positively by investors. For example, on the day of the announcement by DrKoop.com of a four-year strategic alliance with AOL, DrKoop's share price jumped 56% and AOL's share price increased by 5% (Hahn [1999] ). The agreement was renegotiated nine months later when it became apparent that DrKoop was unable to live up to its commitment to buy $89 million of advertising from AOL. A number of contemporaneous observers, such as -31 -consulting firm Jupiter Research, raised questions as to whether the structure of this and other transactions was feasible. A potentially interesting avenue of exploration for theorists is to investigate how bargaining changes under conditions in which both parties have upwardly biased expectations, and whether traditional results obtain in these circumstances.
Figure 1
The evolution of Yahoo!'s homepage. The upper left page is from 1994; the upper right from 1995; the bottom left from 1997; and the bottom right from 1999. The source is Girotto and Rivkin [1999] . Copyright © 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard University. Reprinted with permission. Table 1 Summary statistics. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. Observations are summarized by the date of the agreement, the effort required of the portal and partner (cases where the portal is expected to make the greatest effort are coded as +1, those where the partner is as -1, and those where the effort is shared or not applicable are coded as 0), the traffic on the portal and the partner's Internet properties in the month before the signing of the contract, and the financial position of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (in millions of dollars). Table 2 The allocation of ownership in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. Observations are divided by the date of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner, the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract, and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract. The table presents the ownership of the URL, servers, and customer data, as well as a composite consisting of the sum of all four measures. +1 denoted a case where the ownership was assigned to the portal, -1 those where it was assigned to the partner, and 0 intermediate cases. The rightmost column presents the test statistics from χ 2 -tests of the significance of these differences. In the case of the composite variable (Panel D) the test statistic comes from an F-test, for which the null hypothesis is that the mean value of the composite measure in each category is equal to the mean of the entire sample. Table 3 Ordered logit regression analyses of the allocation of ownership in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variable is the sum of measures of the ownership of the URL, servers, and customer data (+1 denoted a case where the ownership was assigned to the portal, -1 those where it was assigned to the partner, and 0 intermediate cases.) Independent variables include the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases, though in one case the difference in the reach measures is used), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases, though in one case the difference in the actual sales in billions of 1999 dollars is used). Two regressions include controls for the type of the agreement and the portals entering into the agreements (not reported Table 4 Seemingly unrelated regression analysis of individual ownership provisions in portal alliances using an ordered logit specification. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variables are ownership of the URL, servers, and customer data (+1 denoted a case where the ownership was assigned to the portal, -1 those where it was assigned to the partner, and 0 intermediate cases.) Independent variables include the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases (not provided) Breusch-Pagan Statistic (χ 2 (3)) * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% confidence level; *** = significant at the 1% confidence level. j = Jointly significant at the 10% confidence level; jj = Jointly significant at the 5% confidence level; jjj = jointly significant at the 1% confidence level Table 5 The allocation of control in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. Observations are divided by the date of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner, the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract, and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract. The table presents several measures of allocation of control: whether one party's line of business is specified, the material must be explicitly approved by one party, the material must conform to one party's standard, the "look and feel" of the material is determined by one party, one party must mention the other in its advertising, and the advertising copy must be approved by one party. (+1 denoted a case where control was assigned to the portal, -1 those where it was assigned to the partner, and 0 intermediate cases.) The table also reports the presence of a variety of control rights that the portal may exercise over the partner: that the partner must optimize the site for the portal's software or employ the portal's software, that the partner must use frames or other navigational devices, that a good faith effort must be made to return users to the portal, and that the portal receives equity in and board observers rights at the partner. (+1 denoted a case where control was assigned to the portal and 0 where it was not.) The table also presents a composite consisting of the sum of all 12 measures. The rightmost column presents the test statistics from χ 2 -tests of the significance of these differences. In the case of the composite variable (Panel M) the test statistic comes from an F-test, for which the null hypothesis is that the mean value of the composite measure in each category is equal to the mean of the entire sample. Table 6 Ordered logit regression analyses of the allocation of control in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variable is the sum of twelve measures of the allocation of control (+1 denoted a case where the control was assigned to the portal, -1 those where it was assigned to the partner, and 0 intermediate cases.) Independent variables include the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (in most regressions, +1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases, though in one case each the difference in the reach measures, the mean days spent in each month on the site per Internet user, and the mean monthly minutes per Internet user are used), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% confidence level; *** = significant at the 1% confidence level. Table 7 Seemingly unrelated regression analyses of the individual ownership provisions allocation of ownership in portal alliances. The sample consists of 106 alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999. The dependent variables are the 12 control provisions corresponding to panels A through L of Table 4 . Independent variables include the year of the agreement, the relative effort required of the portal and partner after the alliance signing on five key dimensions (with those where the most effort is required of the portal coded as -5 and the most effort by the portal as +5), the relative reach of the portal and the partner in the month before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater reach, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases), and the relative sales of the portal and the partner in the quarter before the signing of the contract (+1 denoted a case where the portal has the greater sales, -1 those where the partner did, and 0 intermediate cases * = Significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% confidence level; *** = significant at the 1% confidence level. j = Jointly significant at the 10% confidence level; jj = Jointly significant at the 5% confidence level; jjj = jointly significant at the 1% confidence level
